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my paper provides an analysis of two antithetical theories about the nature of human 
dignity: human dignity as a status, human dignity as a value. Strengths of the theories 
consist in having developed two relevant traits of human dignity, respectively: human 
dignity as an object of rights, human dignity as a ground of rights. Weaknesses of the 
theories consist in both having excluded one of the two elements. a third paradigm will 
be provided, which tries to explain human dignity both as a status and as a value. 
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my paper is intended to provide an analysis of two antithetical paradigms 
about the nature of human dignity, that constitutions and charters of rights, 
european and non-european, have progressively treated as ground of rights, 
almost starting from the second half XX century. two of the most important 
examples are the Basic law for the Federal republic of germany, come into 
effect on 23rd may, 1949; and the Charter of fundamental rights of the european 
Union, come into effect on 1st december, 2009. 
the paradigms are the conception of human dignity as a status and the 
conception of human dignity as a value.
I found an exemplification of these paradigms in the theories of two 
contemporary philosophers, respectively Jeremy Waldron (*1953), an 
american philosopher of law1, and herbert Spiegelberg (1904-1990), a 
german philosopher, who played a prominent role in the advancement of 
the phenomenological studies in the United States2.
Strengths and weaknesses of human dignity as a status and human dignity 
as a value will be highlighted and a third paradigm will be provided. this last 
one tries to overcome the weaknesses of the previous theories, providing a 
conception of human dignity which explains it as characterized by a double 
nature, both as a status and as a value. An exemplification of this theory can be 
found in the works of aurel kolnai (1900-1973), a hungarian philosopher, who 
studied ethics and axiology, influenced both by phenomenological tradition 
and by British analytic philosophy3.
1.1. A Juridical Idea
Waldron argues that dignity is born as a juridical idea, as a status, tied up with 
rank, conferred to some individuals only, in virtue of their offices (Waldron 
2009, 2). he points out that, in modern time, starting from kant, the concept 
has changed its nature: it turns into a moral idea, conceived as an intrinsic worth, 
recognized to every single human being, in virtue of their humanity.
according to Waldron the thesis that human dignity is an intrinsic worth is 
1  See Waldron (2009). Waldron is Professor at the new york University School of law. 
2  See Spiegelberg (1971). Spiegelberg studied at the universities of heidelberg, Freiburg, and 
Munich. In Freiburg he met Edmund Husserl, who influenced the prosecution of his studies. 
Spiegelberg’s doctoral dissertation was written under the direction of the phenomenologist 
alexander Pfänder and was titled gesetz und Sittengesetz. Spiegelberg applied the 
phenomenological method to the analysis of law and morality, promoting an “ontological 
deontology”. 
3  See kolnai (1976).
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wrong: the concept of human dignity has a legal recognition and no need of an 
underlying moral dignity is required (Waldron 2009, 9).
Placed as ground of human rights, the term “dignity” has changed in 
extension, but not in intension: it still denotes a status, assigned no longer 
to some individuals only but to everyone (Waldron 2009, 28-29).
it expresses the idea of a high-ranking status, comparable to a rank of nobility 
– assigned now equally to every person (Waldron 2009, 12).
1.2. General Rules vs. Particular Rules 
explaining human dignity as a status, Waldron makes a distinction. he says: 
if human dignity is regarded as a status, there remains a duality between 
general norms establishing that status and particular norms like those that 
prohibit degradation (Waldron 2009, 6). 
Waldron distinguishes between general norms and particular norms: general 
rules create human dignity status; particular rules protect that status (Waldron 
2009, 7).
Some of particular rules are affirmative; some are negative.
An example of the affirmative ones is the controversial provision of the 
Universal declaration of human rights, which says that “everyone who works 
has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for him and his 
family an existence worthy of human dignity” (universal declaration of human 
rights, article 23 (3))4.
an example of the negative ones is the ban on degrading treatment.
according to Waldron both kinds of particular rules are important, but 
they do not exhaust the status of human dignity, established by general 
norms, which carries many other rights and duties (Waldron 2009, 6-7).
in my opinion Waldron’s general norms can be treated as Searle’s constitutive 
rules5: Waldron’s account of human dignity as a status, something created by 
norms, is in agreement with Searle’s thesis that human rights are deontic 
powers deriving from an assigned status (Searle 2010, 176).
1.3. Status vs. Intrinsice Worth 
explaining human dignity as a status, Waldron gives an answer to Jeremy 
Bentham’s objection that the reasoning supporting the justification for rights 
is incoherent. 
4  John Searle highlights the controversial character of positive rights: “against whom exactly 
does one have all these rights?” (Searle 2010, 184).
5 about the concept of constitutive rules, see Searle (1969, 1995, 2010). 
HuMAN DIgNITy AS A STATuS VS. HuMAN DIgNITy AS A VAluE. A DOuBlE NATuRE 
BarBara malveStiti università degli Studi di milano
192
Bentham refers to freedom, but the same objection may work for human dignity, 
as Waldron says: the defenders of rights cite freedom or human dignity as the 
ground of their demands; but freedom or human dignity, which are cited as 
the existent ground of rights, are also what is demanded6. the subject of objection 
is interchangeable, it depends on what is specified both as ground of rights 
and as right demanded: freedom, in Bentham’s theory; human dignity, in 
Waldron’s theory.
according to Waldron the objection of incoherence is dispelled if human 
dignity is treated not as an intrinsic worth, as Bentham does with freedom, 
but as a status. conceived as a status, human dignity can be treated both as 
an existent ground and as a right demanded: a status, something accorded, can 
be violated and, at the same time, demanded; conversely, an intrinsic worth, 
something inherent, cannot be violated nor demanded (Waldron 2009, 5).
Waldron’s distinction between human dignity as a right and human dignity as 
a ground of rights is linked with Waldron’s distinction between general rules 
and particular rules: general rules establish the general status of human dignity, 
which provides the ground of rights; particular rules specify the general status, 
concretizing it in an object of rights. 
Waldron agrees on Bentham’s refusal of natural rights. nevertheless, contrary 
to Bentham, who bars freedom from the feature of existence in reason of his 
refusal of natural rights, Waldron is allowed to assign an existence to human 
dignity explaining it as status. Waldron agrees with Bentham on the fact 
that something as an intrinsic worth does not exist, but he says that human 
dignity exists as a status, while Bentham does not actually consider “status” as 
something existent.
Waldron’s analyses are in agreement upon those of John Searle, who states 
that, once we get clear about the ontological status of a juridical entity, its 
existence ceases to be mysterious (Searle 2010, 176).
1.4. An Objection to Waldron’s Thesis 
my objection to Waldron is that while he can grant human dignity an 
existence as an object of rights, he cannot justify it as a ground of rights. 
he adopts the concept of status both for granting human dignity an existence 
as an object of rights, and for justifying it as a ground of rights. But while the 
concept of status is a necessary condition to grant human dignity an existence 
as an object of rights, the same concept is neither a sufficient nor a necessary 
condition to justify human dignity as a ground of rights. 
6  “men ought to be free because they are free, even though they are not” is the reasoning of 
defenders of rights, called by Bentham  “absurd and miserable non-sense” (Bentham 1987, 50).
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Waldron’s distinction between general rules and particular rules does not 
overcome Bentham’s objection: the general status quoted by Waldron as an 
the existent ground for rights is also what is demanded. Waldron’s distinction 
between object of rights and ground of rights means, at most, that rights are 
being put forward as self-justifying.
according to Bentham, the accusation of incoherence is grounded on the fact 
that human rights do not have an independent justification. he says about freedom: 
“It is from beginning to end so much flat assertion: it neither has anything to do 
with reason nor will endure the mention of it. it lays down as a fundamental and 
inviolable principle whatever is in dispute” (Bentham 1987, 74).
the same objection of incoherence is raised by max Scheler to kantian 
foundation of ethics: this last one is incoherent since it does not provide an 
independent basis for justification of duties7.
i argue that a necessary condition to grant human dignity an existence as a 
ground of rights is to consider it not only as a status, but also as a value.
Searle states that we can grant an existence to human rights trough a status 
and, then, justify human rights considering a conception of human nature8. 
in my opinion his approach is faulty since he does not consider that granting 
human dignity an existence as a ground of rights requires, firstly, to consider 
it as a value.
the thesis according to that human dignity can be explained as a value is 
argued by herbert Spiegelberg.
2.1. Potential of Linguistic Phenomenology
herbert Spiegelberg agrees with Waldron upon the fact that human dignity 
is something that charters of rights recognize equally to every single human 
being, but in addition he states the opposite thesis that human dignity is an 
intrinsic worth. 
he argues his thesis applying the method of linguistic phenomenology, a method 
of analysis of concepts, shared by the analytic philosopher John langshaw 
austin and the phenomenologist alexander Pfänder9. 
Spiegelberg highlights the potential of a linguistic phenomenology. 
this phenomenology consists in a linguistic analysis of the ordinary 
meanings, that provides the indispensable and preliminary means to access 
to the phenomena, not yet the direct study of the phenomena themselves. 
language furnishes the means to direct our attention to the facts which 
7  According to Scheler, an independent basis for justification of duties is given by values, not 
by the form of a moral law, as kant argues. See Scheler (1916). 
8  a conception of human nature is “a conception of what is valuable, actually or potentially, about our 
very existence” (Searle 2010, 190).
9  See Spiegelberg (1981).
2.
Human 
Dignity as a 
Value
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constitute our experience, which, without it, we would tend to overlook 
(Spiegelberg 1981, 84).
moreover, linguistic phenomenology allows to remove the inconsistencies of 
our everyday talk about concepts (Spiegelberg 1971, 189). 
applying linguistic phenomenology, Spiegelberg introduces some relevant 
distinctions.  
2.2. Something Inherent and Something to be Achieved
Firstly, Spiegelberg distinguishes between three different meanings we use to 
confuse in ordinary talk:
1. dignity itself;
2. expression of such dignity in the behaviour; 
3. recognition of both by outsiders.
differently from Waldron, Spiegelberg argues that calling human dignity 
inherent and yet something to be achieved is not inconsistent, because we mean 
two different things. In the first case we mean something which man do not 
need and cannot “strive for”; in the second case we mean two possible things, 
both the manifestation of the inherent dignity by the attitude of its owner and 
the recognition of inherent dignity by its erstwhile deniers (Spiegelberg 1971, 
189-190). 
moreover, Spiegelberg distinguishes between:
1. dignity itself; 
4.  Claims issuing from dignity.
he argues that talking about human dignity as unassailable and yet as violated 
is not inconsistent, since we still mean two different things: in the first case 
we mean that in an ultimate sense human dignity cannot be destroyed by any 
attacks; in the second case we mean that violations are in conflict with human 
dignity since they do not fulfill the claim to respect issuing from it (Spiegelberg 
1971, 190).
2.3. Intrinsic Worth and Worthiness of Respect 
Spiegelberg investigates the distinction between (1.) and (4.), noticing that, 
in ordinary talk, there are two special connotational definitions of the term 
“human dignity”: 
1. human dignity as intrinsic worth,
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5. human dignity as worthiness of respect.
human dignity as intrinsic worth means inner, self-sufficient worth of beings by 
themselves, which does not call for any outside complement. 
human dignity as worthiness of respect means an attitude that demands a 
complement: in virtue of worthiness of respect human beings have something 
like a claim to attention, approval, support, and they call for the fulfilment of a 
claim.
While human dignity as intrinsic worth is a matter of mere contemplation, 
human dignity as worthiness of respect calls for action. 
Anyway, it is in virtue of the first sense of dignity, that human beings are 
worthy of respect: the intrinsic worth provides the ground for the claim to 
respect and for its fulfilment, through rights (Spiegelberg 1971, 192-193).
in this way Spiegelberg can explain human dignity as a ground of rights: 
human dignity is a ground of rights as much as it is a value that provides the 
ground for worthiness of respect and for its concretization, through rights.  
Spiegelberg also distinguishes between:
4. claims;
6. rights.
a claim is the act directed toward obtaining certain things due to the 
individual regardless of all artificial regulations.
rights are the instruments that give the possibility of doing something 
(Spiegelberg 1939, 347).
2.4. An Objection to Spiegelberg
differently from Waldron, Spiegelberg gives an account of human dignity as a 
ground of rights, but he does not explain human dignity as an object of rights.
he suggests that one of the best approaches to concretely see human dignity is 
to start from the experience of indignation at the indignities suffered by human 
beings in concrete situations and to ask what revolt us most in what they have 
to undergo (Spiegelberg 1971,  195).
this approach allows to face the concrete situations out of which the outcry 
for human dignity was born, such as: being tortured and forced to make 
confessions; being segregated because of skin color or other native racial 
characteristics; being packed into overcrowded prison cells.
But this approach does not explain human dignity as an object of rights yet. 
Spiegelberg cannot explain human dignity as an object of rights, since he 
considers human dignity as an intrinsic worth only, but not as a status.
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3.1. Strengths and Weaknesses of Previous Paradigms 
the theories of Waldron and Spiegelberg point out two different traits of 
human dignity: human dignity as a status and human dignity as a value.
i found out two strengths in Waldron’s theory:
1. contrary to Bentham, who bars freedom from the feature of 
existence in reason of his refusal of natural rights, Waldron grants 
human dignity an existence. Waldron agrees on Bentham’s refusal 
of natural rights, but he is anyway allowed to assign an existence to 
human dignity explaining it as a status.
2. The definition of human dignity as a status allows to grant human 
dignity an existence in law, to concretize it as an object of rights, to 
define its content. this allows to overcome the problem of vagueness, 
typical of a general clause, such as human dignity, and to satisfy rule of 
law principle.
the weakness of Waldron’s theory is that while it can grant human dignity an 
existence as an object of rights, it cannot explain human dignity as a ground of 
rights.
Being unable to explain human dignity as a ground of rights, the theory does 
not provide the necessary condition that ensures to the system of rights full 
normativity, the justification for rights existence and for their respect. 
on the other hand, i found out these two strengths in Spiegelberg’s theory:
1. it can explain human dignity both as a ground of rights and as 
a claim, thanks to the potential of a phenomenological analysis of 
language, which shows two relevant traits of human dignity: human 
dignity as a value and human dignity as a worthiness of respect. 
2. Providing an account of human dignity as a ground of rights, 
Spiegelberg’s theory provides the necessary condition to ensure for 
the system of rights full normativity. 
Weakness of Spiegelberg’s theory is that it does not provide an account 
of human dignity as a status. in this way, it cannot provide the necessary 
condition to ensure to human dignity an existence in law, a determined content, 
in order to satisfy rule of law principle.
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possible. it tries to explain human dignity as characterized by a double nature, 
both as a status and as a value, in order to ensure both rule of law principle and 
normativity. 
An exemplification of this paradigm can be found in the analysis of Aurel Kolnai.
3.2. Kolnai’s Account: Both a Status and a Value
kolnai argues that human dignity can be considered both as an ascriptive concept 
and as a descriptive concept.
it can be treated as an ascriptive concept, since it is something we ascribe to 
the person. as ascriptive human dignity is a status (kolnai 1976, 258).
it can be treated as a descriptive concept, since we regard it as an inchoate 
quasi-quality, we ascribe to the person as such, independently of its distinctive 
qualities, modes of bearing, mental levels and attitudes, which can be impaired 
and destroyed, temporarily or irreversibly. differently from the other qualities, 
such as dignity only, human dignity is not a matter of more or less, not a 
matter of virtue, and it “seems to be something ‘inalienable’” (kolnai 1976,  
258). it is simply regarded as “the basic quality of being-a-person” (kolnai 1976, 
259)10, thus it demands respect (kolnai 1976, 258).
it “seems to be something ‘inalienable’” like a right, but not in the same 
manner (kolnai 1976, 258). Whereas rights can be disregarded, negated, violated 
or suppressed, human dignity can be impaired. nevertheless it can be impaired 
not as a quality, but as the correspondent claim. Since the claim to respect can 
be impaired, human dignity has to be protected as an object of rights (kolnai 
1976, 258-259).
So, according to kolnai, human dignity has a double nature: it is “a kind of half-
way house between a set of prescriptive claims and the basic quality of being-a-
person”, a “semi-fictitious, semi-real status ‘ascribed’ to the person as such” 
(kolnai 1976, 259)11.
it has both the nature of a status and the nature of a value: as a status it has 
ascribed and prescribed as an object of rights; as a value it is recognized as the 
basic quality of being-a-person, ground of rights, which is to be specified in an 
object of rights. 
as last analysis, human dignity is something ascribed to the person as much as 
it is recognized as the basic quality of being-a-person: “human rights are specified 
rules for other people’s conduct towards a person, grounded in human dignity” 
(kolnai 1976, 259)12.
10  emphasis added.
11  emphasis added.
12  emphasis added.
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3.3. Conclusion
in conclusion, my work tried to develop an explanation of human dignity as 
characterized by a double nature, both as a status and as a value. 
this is a possible way to explain human dignity both as an object of rights 
and as a ground of rights, as it is treated by the charters of rights, and to 
ensure to the system of rights both rule of law and normativity.
nevertheless, the question concerning the relationship between a status 
and a value remains open: is human dignity reducible to the totality of rules, 
which constitute it as a status, providing the conditions for its existence in 
legal systems; or does a concept of human dignity as a value, preexisting to 
these rules, exist?
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